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DIAGONAL FEDERALISM: HOW STATES SHOULD
RESPOND TO INCONSISTENT FEDERAL CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION POLICY
MICHAEL ARNONE*

INTRODUCTION
Federalism is a bedrock principle of American Democracy.1 It informs the structure, powers, and function of the Federal Government.2 It
establishes the parameters of the Federal Government’s relationship with
the states and the states’ relationships with one another.3 It is often the
backdrop to policymaking at the federal and state levels.4 There are many
advantages to this approach to governance, but federalism is not without
its limits, particularly with respect to collective action problems like climate change,5 which can only be successfully addressed when multiple
jurisdictions work together.6
The Covid-19 Pandemic, perhaps more than any recent public
policy challenge, laid bare the advantages and disadvantages of federalism
as a model for responding to collective action problems. 7 In the absence
of strong federal leadership for much of the pandemic, states were left
largely on their own as they responded to a public health crisis which was
*

JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022; BA Political Science, Gettysburg
College, 2015, cum laude. The author is grateful to his family, friends, and classmates
for their patience and support during the Note-writing process. The author would also
like to thank the staff of the Environmental Law & Policy Review for their diligent efforts
to prepare this Note for publication.
1
Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43,
43 (1997).
2
Connor M. Ewing, Structure and Relationship in American Federalism: Foundations,
Consequences, and “Basic Principles” Revisited, 51 TULSA L. REV. 689, 698–99 (2016).
3
Id. at 699–702.
4
Id.
5
Erin Ryan, Lessons from the Coronavirus Pandemic for Environmental Governance, L.
PROFESSOR BLOGS: ENV’T L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 21, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/environmental_law/2020/06/lessons-from-the-coronavirus-pandemic-for-en
vironmental-governance.html [https://perma.cc/XR8X-3CFV].
6
See Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Fifty Years Later, 164 PUB. CHOICE 195, 196 (2015)
(defining “collective action” as a situation “. . . when the efforts of two or more individuals
or agents (e.g. countries) are required to accomplish an outcome.”).
7
Ryan, supra note 5.
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national in scope.8 This contributed to a patchwork of policies across the
nation;9 less efficient allocation and use of scarce healthcare resources;10
and frequent spikes in Covid-19 cases as regional outbreaks spread to
states which had previously contained the disease’s spread.11
One can easily imagine a very different scenario with a very different outcome. The Federal Government provides a strong, centralized
response to a national problem, but also partners with the states and
allows them to tailor their responses as needed. This policymaking approach preserves the balance of federal-state power, but leads to more
consistent and efficient outcomes. States can presumably respond to unique
local issues stemming from the larger national problem more efficiently
than the Federal Government. The Federal Government, in turn, can distribute resources more efficiently and ensure a level of consistency across
state policies.
How the Federal Government and the states respond to climate
change is unlikely to fit cleanly into either of the paradigms described
above. Ideally, the latter approach would predominate, but states should
be prepared for it to be the exception, not the rule. Covid-19 and its aftereffects have shown that while states should not have to act without the
Federal Government, alternative means of making policy in the face of
a collective action problem are available to them when the Federal Government becomes an unreliable policymaking partner.
This Note will argue that diagonal federalism—a model of governance in which states partner with one another and local governments
to pursue shared policy goals—is an ideal response to inconsistent climate
change mitigation policy by the Federal Government. Part I provides an
overview of the foundations of American environmental policy, how that
policy is predicated on federal-state partnership, and the historical precedent for state-led action on climate change mitigation policy. Part II discusses how and why federal environmental policy, and by extension, federal
climate change mitigation policy, has been so inconsistent. Part III illustrates how collaboration between the Federal Government and the states

8

Id.
Ellen Barry, ‘It’s Totally Ad Hoc’: Why America’s Virus Response Looks Like a Patchwork,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/us/united-states-corona
virus-response.html [https://perma.cc/PC7C-EJSX].
10
Id.
11
Manny Fernandez & Mitch Smith, As Virus Hits Rural U.S., Numbers May Be Small,
but the Impact Is Not, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10
/14/world/covid-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5QNA-4H4S].
9
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is possible but remains rare with respect to climate change mitigation
policy. Part IV proposes diagonal federalism as an alternative course of
action for states in lieu of cooperation with the Federal Government. While
there are important legal and practical limitations to this approach, it
remains the most viable alternative to states as they grapple with an
unreliable partner in the Federal Government.
I.

FEDERALISM AS A VEHICLE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
POLICY

A.

American Environmental Policy Is Rooted in Cooperative
Federalism

For most of American history, the states have been responsible for
their own environmental policy.12 It was not until the amended Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) were passed in the 1970s
that the Federal Government began to play a larger role.13 These landmark statutes form the basis of modern American environmental policy,
and they were crafted with the intention of federal and state governments
acting as partners.14 Under this cooperative federalism model, the Federal Government is empowered to set overall policy goals through regulations, and states are tasked with their implementation and enforcement.15
Congress’s motivation in using cooperative federalism as a guiding
principle when drafting the CAA and CWA was rooted in concerns that
the regulatory task was simply too large for the Federal Government alone
to manage and that if states were completely preempted, federal resources would be overwhelmed.16 Scholars have argued that Congress
was simply shifting blame to the states for a sensitive issue.17 Others

12

Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean Power
Plan has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 301, 313 (2017).
13
Adam Isen et al., Every Breath You Take—Every Dollar You’ll Make: The Long-Term
Consequences of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 125 J. POL. ECON. 848, 855–56 (2017); Josh
Epperly et al., Relationships between Borders, Management Agencies, and the Likelihood
of Watershed Impairment, 13 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2018).
14
Pacyniak, supra note 12, at 313.
15
Id.
16
John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1192 (1993).
17
Id.; Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265,
275 (1990).

572

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:569

have suggested, less cynically, that the rationale was to prevent a race
to the bottom by states seeking to attract industry with more lax environmental policies.18
This regulatory scheme has been criticized by proponents of a more
centralized policymaking model, especially in recent years.19 Arguments
for the latter are, on their face, attractively simple and powerful.20 Climate
change specifically, and the environment generally, are issues too large
for any one state to address.21 Furthermore, even partial regulation by
an individual state risks more lax jurisdictions free riding on the former’s
regulatory benefits.22 That laxity, in turn, could contribute to overall pollution increases.23 In short, the size of the regulator should be comparable to that of the problem.24 Thus, a top-down approach to climate change
mitigation policy would be ideal.25
Advocates for a strong state role in American climate change
mitigation policy, conversely, point out that the very size of the problem
requires a more nuanced policy solution.26 Climate change is far from one
dimensional—its effects are diverse and varied from region to region.27
As such, unique local consequences will inevitably arise—whether they be
economic, environmental, or both.28 A top-down approach would deprive
states of the flexibility needed to address such problems.29
State-led policy initiatives may be more likely to encourage bottomup participation by affected constituencies in ways a federal, top-down

18

Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1226 (1992).
19
See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. J. 557, 584–93 (2000).
20
William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1071.
21
See id. at 1068–69.
22
Id. at 1069.
23
See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 293, 298–99 (2008).
24
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1071.
25
Id.
26
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New “Old”
Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When
States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, 87–89 (2007).
27
Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The
Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 798 (2008).
28
Id.
29
See Shama Gamkhar & J. Mitchell Pickerell, The State of American Federalism in
2011–2012: A Fend for Yourself and Activist Form of Bottom-Up Federalism, 42 J. FEDERALISM 357, 368–71 (2012).
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policy might not.30 That engagement can provide policymakers with information critical to more effective responses.31 Greater state independence allows for greater regulatory innovation.32 This “laboratories of
democracy” argument is particularly strong in the face of new, uncertain
public policy challenges such as climate change.33 Differing approaches
could provide regulatory models, good and bad, for other jurisdictions to
emulate.34 Allowing this room for adjustment and experimentation is
beneficial in response to a fluid policy problem.35 It also provides protection against unforeseen negative consequences that may result from a
particular policy.36 If a policy falls short in a top-down regulatory scheme,
preempted states are powerless to counteract its negative effects.37 With
greater state power, that risk is significantly reduced.38
Despite these diverging arguments for greater state independence
versus greater federal control, the overall framework of American environmental policy has not changed substantially since the 1970s. Cooperative federalism remains the backdrop for such policymaking, whether at
the federal or state level, and is the context within which American
climate change mitigation policy has evolved.
B.

Historical Precedent Supports State-Level Climate Change
Mitigation Policy

Contrary to what critics of American environmental federalism
have alleged, the scale of climate change as a problem has not deterred
states from taking action independent of the Federal Government.39 This
has, of course, been enabled by the federal-state partnership envisioned
30

McKinstry & Peterson, supra note 26, at 87.
Id.
32
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1619 (2007); Kristen H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J.
159, 182 (2006).
33
Buzbee, supra note 32, at 1619.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23,
51–53 (1996).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Pacyniak, supra note 12, at 316.
31
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by the drafters of the CAA and CWA.40 It must be acknowledged that this
system has led to inconsistent environmental policies among the states,
with some taking a more proactive approach to climate change and others
a more passive stance.41 That said, the consistency with which states
have taken the lead on climate change policy far exceeds what the drafters of the CAA and CWA anticipated.42
This state-led action has included widespread adoption of renewable energy and efficiency mandates; development and implementation
of greenhouse gas vehicle standards by over a dozen states, most notably
California; adoption of the regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative cap-andtrade program for power plants by nine states in the northeast and midAtlantic; and a similar cap-and-trade program implemented by California.43
States have also created renewable portfolio standards, tax credits,
deductions, and subsidies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve
co-benefits such as reduced climate change-related health risks and market presence in the green economy.44
Superficially, these policies could be explained away as state
government officials responding to the policy preferences of their electorates or, alternatively, a desire to protect economic development from the
effects of climate change to better compete with other states.45 Cooperative
federalism, however, has played an important role as well.46 California’s
greenhouse gas vehicle standards and the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, for instance, initially resulted from interactions between the
Federal Government and those states.47
The Federal Government has contributed to these state-led policies
by indirect means.48 The Bush administration, particularly toward the
end of its tenure, resisted taking any action to mitigate climate change.49
40

See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 1192.
U.S. EPA, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 12-P-0113, EPA MUST IMPROVE OVERSIGHT
OF STATE ENFORCEMENT (2011); Nicholas L. Fowler, States and Federal Environmental
Policy: A Hierarchal Linear Model of CAA and CWA Implementation (May 2013) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Mississippi State University) (ProQuest).
42
See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 1192.
43
Pacyniak, supra note 12, at 316.
44
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1072.
45
Pacyniak, supra note 12, at 316; see discussion infra Section II.A.
46
See Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T J.L. 1, 18–41 (2005).
47
Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. L. REV. 1097,
1099–100 (2009).
48
See id.
49
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1071; see discussion infra Part II.
41
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While tensions emerged between the White House and agency officials,
notably when Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) language acknowledging
the impact of climate change on human health was deleted from an official report, federal inaction was the result.50
This federal inaction led to the state actions described above, among
other policy initiatives.51 While it is true that some of those initiatives were
informed by federal-state engagement, states themselves took action in the
absence of stronger federal leadership on climate change mitigation policy.
States have not limited themselves to policy initiatives in the face
of federal inaction; they have also pursued legal action against the Federal Government to further their own policy goals.52 Massachusetts v.
EPA is notable because it set in motion several climate change-related
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulatory actions which were
consistent with Massachusetts’s own policies.53 As a result of the litigation, the EPA instituted limits on future auto emissions and issued the
“Tailoring Rule,”54 which sought to regulate existing stationary sources
of greenhouse gas emissions.55
The historical trend of state-led action on climate change mitigation policy shows the extent to which states, not the Federal Government,
have frequently taken the lead in responding to a pressing collective
action problem. States have thus shown that while they have not always
acted consistently with the cooperative federalism framework established
by the CAA and CWA, effective policymaking is possible in the absence of
federal action, even within the boundaries of that framework. And, despite the contrary expectations of academics and policymakers alike,
state-led climate change mitigation has been effective, if limited in scope.
While a consistently engaged Federal Government would enhance the
reach of these policies, it is notable what states have already achieved
50

Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1072; see discussion infra Sections II.A, III.A.
Hillary Rosner, How State and Local Governments Are Leading the Way on Climate
Policy, AUDUBON (Fall 2019), https://www.audubon.org/magazine/fall-2019/how-state-and
-local-governments-are-leading-way [https://perma.cc/S9K3-CE9K]; Nieves et al., States Are
Doing What Big Government Won’t to Stop Climate Change, and Want Stimulus Funds to
Help, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/09092
020/states-rural-government-coronavirus-stimulus-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc
/W3KB-GVLW].
52
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1073; see generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
53
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1074; see discussion infra Section II.B.
54
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31514-01 (June 6, 2010).
55
Buzbee, supra note 20, at 1075; but see Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S.
302, 332–34 (2014) (The “Tailoring Rule” was later overturned.).
51
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without substantial federal engagement. This background is important
context within which diagonal federalism and climate change mitigation
policy must be considered.
II.

INCONSISTENT FEDERAL ACTION

A.

Federal Policy Influenced by Political Priorities

Federal environmental policy, and, by extension, federal climate
change mitigation policy, is complex, challenging to enact, and difficult to
implement.56 Some of that difficulty and complexity results from structural
hurdles which must be overcome (as addressed further in subheading B),
but American politics is perhaps the most salient contributing factor.57
As an electorate, Americans have historically been skeptical of
federal environmental legislation and regulation.58 As noted above, the
Federal Government has traditionally been a minor player with respect
to environmental policy.59 Even since the passage of the CAA and CWA,
the Federal Government has vacillated between playing an active role in
environmental policy and adopting a more passive stance.60 Furthermore,
an active Federal Government has not always translated to the advancement of climate change mitigation.61 At times, federal policy has been
hostile even to state efforts to curb climate change.62
Resistance to climate change mitigation policies is particularly
strong within the Republican Party, both among its voters and elected
officials.63 Since the 1980s and 1990s, the Republican Party has become
more ideologically homogenous and coalesced around cultural issues that
animate its base voters—voters who skew more conservative in their
56

Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Learning from the Leader: The European Union’s
Renewable Energy Mandates as a Blueprint for American Environmental Federalism, 65
RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 183 (2012).
57
Id. at 183–84.
58
Id.
59
See discussion supra Section I.A.
60
Benjamin Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need
for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 397,
410–15 (2008).
61
Id. at 415–17; James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the
Political Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. L. REV. 919, 926–28 (2008).
62
Id.
63
Aaron M. McCright et al., Increasing Influence of Party Identification on Perceived
Scientific Agreement and Support for Government Action on Climate Change in the United
States, 2006–12, 6 WEATHER, CLIMATE & SOC’Y 194, 194 (2014).
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political preferences.64 Republicans generally view climate change with
skepticism, often doubting scientific evidence that climate change is even
happening.65 Democrats, conversely, are more likely to trust that evidence.66 Government actions that would address climate change, then, are
frequently viewed by Republicans as vehicles for the Democratic Party’s—
or even socialist’s—public policy preferences to be enacted.67
Consequently, climate change denial has become one of many
litmus tests Republican candidates must often pass in order to win competitive primary elections.68 As a result, Republican base voters have
become over-represented among elected Republican officials.69 At the same
time, more moderate Republican voters and elected officials who might
support policies that address climate change have become increasingly
sidelined within their party.70 Conservative Republican officials have cast
climate change mitigation policies as a means for Democrats to curtail
individual liberty and freedom.71 Within this framework, climate change
mitigation becomes a cultural issue to be fought, rather than a public
policy challenge to be solved.72
That ideology renders federal intrusion into what is traditionally
a state prerogative unpalatable at best to many political leaders.73 And
federal environmental regulation is simply antithetical to many similarly
aligned interest groups and their representatives in Washington.74
This certainly explains efforts by the Republican Party to roll back
the Federal Government’s role in making climate change mitigation policy.
In 1995, a Republican Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act (“the Act”), which made it more difficult for the Federal Government
to impose mandates on the states.75 The Act required more detailed cost
estimates for such mandates, which made it easier for their opponents
64

Jean-Daniel Collomb, The Ideology of Climate Change Denial in the United States, 9
EUR. J. AM. STUD. 1, 5–6 (2014).
65
W.J. Wouter Botzen et al., Political Affiliation Affects Adaptation to Climate Risks:
Evidence from New York City, 138 CLIMATIC CHANGE 353, 356–57 (2016); Collomb, supra
note 64, at 5–6.
66
Botzen et al., supra note 65, at 356–57.
67
Collomb, supra note 64, at 6.
68
McCright et al., supra note 63, at 194; Collomb, supra note 64, at 7.
69
McCright et al., supra note 63, at 195.
70
Id. at 194.
71
Collomb, supra note 64, at 6.
72
Id.
73
Jayanti, supra note 56, at 184.
74
Id.
75
Sovacool, supra note 60, at 414; 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (1995).
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to overturn or simply defund them through the legislative process.76 Federal agencies under the Bush administration avoided creating new regulations on greenhouse gases (“GHG”), despite statutory authority to do
so under the CAA.77 In 2007, the EPA went so far as to deny a petition
from California to regulate GHG emissions from new automobiles.78
More recently, the Trump administration adopted an even more
conservative stance toward climate change mitigation.79 During President Trump’s tenure, the Federal Government withdrew from the Paris
Climate Accord;80 dramatically expanded natural gas and oil drilling in
American waters, national forests, and national monuments;81 loosened
vehicle emissions standards against the preferences of major automobile
manufacturers;82 and repealed the Clean Water Rule,83 among other major
climate change-related policy changes.
Additionally, the politics of climate change mitigation are unusual
in that they involve a collective action problem, unlike many public policy
issues.84 So however attractive it may be to conclude that political ideology alone informs policymakers’ response to climate change, it is likely

76

Sovacool, supra note 60, at 414.
May, supra note 61, at 927.
78
Id. at 927–28.
79
See Cayli Baker, The Trump Administration’s Major Environmental Deregulations,
BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/12
/15/the-trump-administrations-major-environmental-deregulations/ [https://perma.cc
/M3QN-PUNH].
80
Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-cli
mate.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ4X-UFGL].
81
Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List,N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/inter
active/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/7MZA-NZXJ].
82
Nathan Rott & Jennifer Ludden, Trump Administration Weakens Auto Emissions
Standards, NPR (Mar. 31, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/31/824431240
/trump-administration-weakens-auto-emissions-rolling-back-key-climate-policy [https://
perma.cc/GC5M-WMZS]; Coral Davenport & Hiroko Tabuchi, Automakers, Rejecting Trump
Pollution Rule, Strike a Deal with California, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/07/25/climate/automakers-rejecting-trump-pollution-rule-strike-a-deal
-with-california.html [https://perma.cc/6FEX-REUX].
83
Lisa Friedman & Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Rolls Back Clean Water Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/climate/trump
-administration-rolls-back-clean-water-protections.html [https://perma.cc/HK4R-S6XN].
84
Jayanti, supra note 56, at 183; see Sandler, supra note 6, at 196 (defining “collective
action” as a situation “. . . when the efforts of two or more individuals or agents (e.g.—
countries) are required to accomplish an outcome.”).
77
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that the nature of the problem itself reinforces the political ideology used
to justify federal policy.85
For an individual, the tangible effects of climate change may not
always comport with its perceived causes.86 One may understand intellectually that GHG emissions from automobiles contribute to climate change
but see little impact on daily life as a result. This contributes to a cognitive dissonance that buttresses a long-prevailing American political ideology that the Federal Government need not prescribe policy solutions to
a problem when those solutions appear disproportionate in relation to
that problem.87 The average voter may simply be unwilling to accept
higher automobile prices that result from more onerous federal GHG regulations if the impact of higher emissions does not manifest in that
voter’s daily life.88
Americans’ political preferences may be a major contributing
factor to federal climate change mitigation policy, but it would be reductive
to treat those preferences as dispositive. A prevailing national political
ideology which favors less federal climate change regulation and legislation plays an important role, to be sure; but the logic of that ideology is
strengthened by the nature of climate change itself as a collective action
problem. It is plausible, then, that absent the cognitive dissonance between
the causes and effects of climate change that the national politics of climate change mitigation policy could shift in favor of a larger role for the
Federal Government.
B.

Institutional Barriers to Creating Federal Environmental Policy

In addition to politics, the structure of the Federal Government itself substantially handicaps the process of making national environmental policy.89 Legislation, the basis for federal policymaking, is difficult to

85

Jayanti, supra note 56, at 183.
Id.
87
Id.
88
See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1135 (2010); Lee Ross et al., The Climate Change Challenge
and Barriers to the Exercise of Foresight Intelligence, 66 BIOSCIENCE 363, 364–65 (2016);
Nsikan Akpan, How Your Brain Stops You from Taking Climate Change Seriously, PBS
(Jan. 7, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-your-brain-stops
-you-from-taking-climate-change-seriously [https://perma.cc/5ZD5-WWL2].
89
See Aziz Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66
STAN. L. REV. 217, 266 (2014).
86
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pass into law.90 Starting in committees, which are the source of most
proposed legislation, bills must first survive a vote to be sent to the floor
of the House of Representatives or the Senate.91 In the Senate, legislative
filibusters often derail bills.92 Senators can also place indefinite holds on
a bill which functionally impose a unanimity rule before any proposed
legislation can receive a floor vote.93 Even if a bill passes both chambers,
a president of a different party than the controlling majority in Congress—
or one simply opposed to the bill for political or policy reasons—can issue
a veto.94 Congress can override that veto, but only by a two-thirds majority of each chamber.95
The result is that, in practice, the federal legislative process often
fails to generate law, even when law is wanted or needed by a majority of
the nation.96 The CAA, for instance, has not been updated since 1990.97 The
1990 CAA followed a series of environmental laws passed in the 1970s and
1980s and introduced a market-based approach to regulating emissions—
cap-and-trade—to the federal regulatory process.98 This law has inspired
subsequent attempts at legislative reforms, notably in the early years of
the Obama administration, but without success in large part because of
the structural minefield through which proposed laws must pass.99
At the administrative level, federal agencies—in particular the
EPA—have significant delegated power from Congress in shaping natural,
environmental and climate change mitigation policy.100 The regulatory
law these agencies make is binding; however, the power to make such law
is neither unlimited nor invulnerable to court challenges.101
This delegation produces inconsistent results, usually depending on
the political priorities of the administration in power.102 Under the Bush
90

Id.
Huq, supra note 89, at 266; see Barbara Sinclair, The Role of Committees in Agenda
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administration, the EPA was generally passive in its approach to GHG
regulation.103 This passivity was a significant driver behind Massachusetts’s decision to sue the agency in Massachusetts v. EPA, which resulted
in the Supreme Court ordering the EPA to regulate GHGs as pollutants.104
Under the Bush administration, the EPA was also resistant to state
measures meant to address climate change, such as the aforementioned
denial of California’s petition to regulate GHGs from new automobiles.105
Under the Obama administration, the EPA pursued an ambitious
regulatory agenda known as the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) after failing
to pass a comprehensive climate change bill through Congress.106 The
CPP was notable in that it would have intertwined federal regulation
with state and utility innovations.107 The goal of such an apparently contradictory approach was to encourage more regulators and businesses to
participate and, in so doing, create a web of relationships that would
incentivize climate change mitigation policies.108 The CPP was met with
pointed challenges that it was an unconstitutional power grab that infringed on the role of state regulators.109 The finalized rule itself was
stayed by the Supreme Court.110
Delegated authority from Congress allows federal agencies to act
with more speed (and perhaps agility) than the federal legislative process.111 Yet the confluence of competing political ideologies within this
structural feature of federal environmental policymaking contributes to
seesawing policies across administrations.112
Constitutional and judicial barriers can also impede or limit
federal environmental policy. The Constitution itself does not explicitly
grant any branch of the Federal Government power to create or enforce
environmental law.113 Such statutes have been upheld by the Supreme
103
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Court, however, as valid exercises of Congress’s commerce and spending
powers,114 but that authority is not absolute.115 The scope and power of
many federal environmental statutes have been whittled away by numerous court challenges, usually in instances where Congress has crossed
the line from encouraging to compelling state behavior.116
Finally, any federal environmental regulation cannot be the result
of an impermissible delegation from Congress to a regulatory agency.117
As discussed above, delegation of authority is an important part of federal policymaking, but taken too far, it can result in the invalidation of
a regulation.118 Under this Nondelegation Doctrine, Congress may delegate
to an agency such that the agency is empowered to determine how a law
will be implemented, but it must also provide that agency with an “intelligible principle” which constrains the agency’s actions.119 Congress
cannot avoid a difficult decision by giving an agency power to decide what
will inform its regulatory goals, it must provide that guidance through
a statute.120 Generally, nondelegation is seldom an impediment to federal
environmental laws when they are challenged in court.121 That said, the
broader the language of a law, the greater the chance it will be struck
down partially or entirely.122
In tandem, the political and structural barriers to creating federal
environmental policy described above, present formidable challenges to
a consistent national climate change mitigation policy. Many of the structural obstacles are inherent to a federal system of government, while the
political impediments are somewhat more fluid in nature. Their confluence in the face of climate change has hobbled the Federal Government’s
ability to respond to what is perhaps the most pressing collective action
problem of our time.
114
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III.

FEDERAL-STATE COLLABORATION

A.

Federal-State Collaboration Is the Exception, Not the Rule, in
American Climate Change Mitigation Policy

Beginning in the 1970s, the Federal Government asserted a larger
role in American environmental policy with the enactment of the CAA and
CWA.123 In addition, a number of similar statutes entered into force in
the 1970s.124 Together, these form the basic framework of modern American
environmental—and by extension—climate change mitigation policy.125
Under this policymaking model, the Federal Government sets general
policy goals and parameters, but delegates substantial enforcement and
implementation powers to the states.126 That framework presumes the
Federal Government and the states will act as partners in pursuing shared
public policy challenges.127 Indeed, its success arguably depends upon such
collaboration.128 The historical trend, however, is one of federal disengagement from, and even hostility toward, the states with respect to climate change mitigation policy.
Following the creation of this statutory framework the Federal
Government began to retrench from collaboration with the states.129 Congress has not passed landmark environmental or climate change mitigation legislation since the passage of the CAA of 1990,130 which amended
the original CAA to include cap and trade provisions.131 Federal policymaking with respect to climate change mitigation since 1990 has occurred
almost exclusively through administrative rule-making.
Concurrently, skepticism of climate change and resistance to mitigation policies began to grow within the Republican Party around this
time.132 This contributed to the emergence of a prevailing plurality (if not
a majority) within the American electorate that disfavors climate change
mitigation policies at the federal level.133 It is within this context that
successive administrations have addressed climate change.
123
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The Clinton administration did enact more stringent air pollution
regulations than its predecessors.134 These limited emissions from power
plants, and promoted cleaner, more efficient cars and alternative fuels.135
Yet for most of its tenure, the Clinton administration had to contend with
a Republican Congress opposed to much of its agenda.136 As noted above,
Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995.137 This limited the
Federal Government’s ability to impose mandates on the states without
also providing funding for those mandates.138 With Congress also controlling the appropriation of federal funds, the Clinton administration’s ability
to address climate change was curtailed.139
The Bush administration accelerated the trend of federal retrenchment from climate change mitigation policy.140 With unified Republican
control of the Federal Government, there was potential at the outset of
President Bush’s term for more collaborative climate change mitigation
policy between the Federal Government and the states.141 Two statutes
that promised such collaboration, the 2002 Small Business Liability and
Revitalization Act142 and the 2003 Healthy Forests Restoration Act,143 were
both enacted during President Bush’s first term. The former was meant
to engage state and local governments in the cleanup and redevelopment
of Superfund sites. The latter was intended to offer state and local officials greater authority over land-use decisions to prevent wildfires.144
Both of these initiatives failed, however, because of subsequent substantial
cuts in federal funding.145
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The 2005 Energy Policy Act, which the Bush administration
strongly supported, constrained state authority over environmental policy.146 The EPA advanced regulations under this Act which were favorable
to the energy industry, ostensibly to promote domestic energy development, but overrode state and local government influence in the process.147
Also in 2005, Congress passed, with the Bush administration’s support,
an appropriations bill that prohibited states from duplicating California’s
more stringent emissions standards for cars and trucks.148
The Bush administration’s hostility towards the states with respect to climate change mitigation policy contributed to many states
pursuing their own climate change mitigation policies.149 Some states, like
Massachusetts, litigated against the Federal Government’s inaction and
hostility.150 Many pursued renewable energy initiatives and GHG reduction goals.151 Others partnered together in regional agreements like the
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.152
The Obama administration attempted to enact the American Clean
Energy and Security Act in 2009, which, if adopted would have been the
first major federal legislation to address climate change.153 The bill was
passed by the House of Representatives but failed to overcome a filibuster
in the Senate.154 The administration instead pursued regulatory action
to mitigate climate change.155 These actions, discussed further below, are
outliers in the overall trend of federal disengagement from or hostility
toward climate change mitigation policy.
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The Obama administration pursued higher vehicle fuel efficiency
standards and allocated funds to encourage domestic renewable energy
production.156 Most significantly, however, the Obama administration’s
CPP represented a major shift toward increased federal-state collaboration
on climate change mitigation.157 The CPP was subject to lawsuits almost
as soon as it was announced, and the Supreme Court stayed the final rule
from going into effect while lower courts adjudicated those cases.158 The
Trump administration took office while the CPP was being litigated in
court and attempted to replace the rule.159 The Obama administration’s
regulatory actions demonstrate the limits of efforts to further collaboration between the Federal Government and the states to mitigate climate
change in the face of significant structural and political obstacles.
The Trump administration, by contrast, continued and amplified
the trend of federal disengagement and hostility toward state-level climate change mitigation. The Trump administration attempted to revoke
California’s waiver from the EPA to set stricter emissions standards than
the Federal Government.160 This proposed rule change prompted California
and several other states to sue the administration.161
The EPA under the Trump administration also proposed the
Affordable Clean Energy rule (“ACE”) as a replacement of the CPP.162
Massachusetts v. EPA required the EPA to regulate GHGs, so the EPA
156
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could not permissibly shirk this responsibility.163 ACE, however, only applied to coal-fired power plants, which meant that states were limited in
their options if they attempted to reduce carbon emissions from other
sources.164 States would still have some flexibility in implementing ACE,
but the EPA indicated that it would not approve of state regulatory plans
that were more stringent than ACE itself, unlike the agency’s approach
to implementing the CPP under the Obama administration.165 ACE was
challenged in court and never entered into force. On January 19, 2021, the
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit overturned the CPP on grounds that
it violated the CAA of 1990, leaving the incoming Biden administration
an opportunity to rewrite the rule.166
As the overview above demonstrates, collaboration between the Federal Government and the states on climate change mitigation is historically rare. The overall trend in recent decades has been one of federal
neglect and hostility toward state mitigation efforts. Enacting federal legislation to address climate change has proven daunting, in large part due
to Senate filibusters and Republican opposition to such statutory changes.
As a consequence, the federal response to climate change has
taken the form of regulatory action. Regulations, by their nature, are less
static than statutes and more vulnerable to the ideological differences
between administrations. Indeed, the CPP, arguably the best attempt yet
at federal-state collaboration to mitigate climate change, was itself stymied
by the Trump administration, albeit with only partial success.
This recent history would seem to suggest that states can and
should expect a Federal Government that is at best disengaged and at
worst hostile toward their own attempts at climate change mitigation. Absent major changes in American politics and institutional structures—
particularly Republican climate change denial and the Senate filibuster,
respectively, it is likely that federal climate change policy will continue
through regulation, not legislation. While states may hope for more collaborative federal rule-making like the CPP in the future, the vulnerability
of such regulations to court challenges and changes in presidential administrations severely curtails their longevity and stability.
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The Clean Power Plan as a Model for Federal-State
Collaboration

The CPP was the first major federal regulation to address climate
change under the EPA’s CAA authority.167 While it never went into effect
and is not without flaws, the CPP remains an aspirational model for future
federal-state collaboration in climate change mitigation policymaking.
The CPP represented a break from the overall trend in federal
environmental policy for several reasons.168 First, it regulated carbon emissions from existing sources of GHGs as well as future sources.169 Second,
it applied to the electricity industry as a whole, rather than individual
sources of carbon emissions.170 Finally, the CPP was informed by extensive
outreach and engagement with affected stakeholders and incorporated
their feedback into the final rule.171 This departs from a traditionally topdown approach to the EPA’s rule-making.172
The CPP would have set overall reductions in power plant carbon
emissions but given states flexibility in meeting those goals.173 States would
have had the choice of meeting these emission reductions by: (1) increasing the efficiency of fossil fuel power plants (primarily coal-fired plants);
(2) substituting natural gas-fired power plants for coal-fired plants; and/or
(3) maintaining and increasing zero-emission sources of energy.174
The CPP is notable for its focus on collaboration between the
Federal Government and the states.175 Many of the CPP’s performance
standards were drawn directly from similar state policies already in effect.176 Rather than crafting its standards in a vacuum, the EPA drew on
the policy experiences of states that had taken the lead on climate change
mitigation policy.177
167
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The CPP’s performance standards, furthermore, were tailored to
each state individually based on that state’s ability to meet the CPP’s
emission reduction goals.178 This assumed good faith and best practices
on the part of each state in implementing the CPP, and was a stark contrast to more traditional rule-making.179 This made sure that states would
be more likely to actually meet the EPA’s emissions reductions goals.180
By avoiding a more rigid rule, the CPP imposed burdens on the states
that reflect their individual ability to implement climate change mitigation policies.181
There are many advantages to the CPP’s structure. First, it capitalized on existing expertise among the states to mitigate climate change
instead of starting from scratch.182 Second, in giving states flexibility to
meet emissions standards, states would have been encouraged to continue
innovating.183 Rather than a blunt mandate, the CPP’s nuanced approach
to implementation increased the likelihood that it would cultivate a web
of relationships between the Federal Government, the states, regulated
entities, and consumers.184 This interconnectedness would presumably
create incentives for all parties to work collaboratively toward addressing
a collective action problem.185 More traditional federal environmental
regulation, by its top-down nature, did not foster such relationships.186
A major downside to the CPP’s structure, however, stemmed from
its flexibility.187 In crafting emissions standards for each state based on
its ability to actually reduce emissions, some states were given larger
reduction goals than others.188 This would have disproportionately required
states that had already invested in renewable energy sources and emissions reduction technologies to do more to reduce their emissions.189 States
that had not made such investments, especially those relying on coalfired power plants for electricity, by comparison, would have had lower
emissions reduction targets.190
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How successful the CPP would have been is difficult to anticipate
with certainty, as it was never implemented. Some empirical evidence,
however, suggests that the CPP would have reduced American carbon
emissions over the course of the century.191 The degree to which emissions
would be reduced, however, would have been dependent on the nature and
consistency of state enforcement of the CPP.192
Nevertheless, the CPP remains a model for potential federal-state
collaboration in climate change mitigation policymaking. As noted above,
it seems unlikely that such collaboration will occur in the future. The
success of such federal action would be enhanced if it was legislative in
origin, rather than regulatory.193 Still, state policies to mitigate climate
change will be more effective if they take place within a broader federal
framework, which is national in scope. Accordingly, states should seek
opportunities to collaborate with the Federal Government on climate
change mitigation policymaking whenever possible, however unlikely
such opportunities may be in practice.
IV.

DIAGONAL FEDERALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FEDERAL-STATE
COLLABORATION

A.

Defining Diagonal Federalism and Its Advantages

Diagonal federalism derives its theoretical underpinnings from
cooperative federalism.194 Both focus on cooperation between different
levels of government, but while cooperative federalism is generally concerned with the relationship between the Federal Government and the
states, diagonal federalism emphasizes cooperation between and among
the states, municipalities, and the Federal Government.195 Diagonal federalism, then, is an approach to regulatory governance that blends vertical
interactions between different levels of government (e.g., state to municipality) and horizontal interactions across jurisdictions at the same level
of government (e.g., state to state, municipality to municipality).196
Diagonal federalism is inherent to most public policymaking in
the United States, although it is usually characterized more broadly as
191
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cooperative federalism.197 The relationship between the Federal Government and the states demonstrates this dynamic, which incorporates vertical
and horizontal elements.198 Diagonal federalism does happen on smaller
scales, often between states and municipalities.199 State and local governments pursuing joint climate change mitigation policies in recent decades
are an example.200 Such policies can dovetail with complimentary ones
that happen at a larger scale, as is the case with states and municipalities
conforming to the Paris Climate Accord, even after the Trump administration withdrew from it.201
Diagonal federalism has become more prevalent in the United
States, particularly with respect to climate change mitigation policy, since
the 1990s.202 As the Federal Government has disengaged and become
openly hostile to climate change mitigation, state and local governments
have increasingly taken the lead in developing mitigation policies.203 This
trend accelerated markedly during the Trump administration’s tenure.204
This approach to policy creation has many advantages. In certain
ways, horizontal regulatory structures may be particularly effective at
making policy.205 Participating stakeholders, usually various states,
benefit from commonalities in governance that allow them to experiment
with different policies more efficiently because they can share infrastructure and resources.206 Yet without some degree of vertical integration
with higher levels of government, horizontal policymaking can duplicate
efforts in other jurisdictions and cause leakage.207 The latter in particular
can instigate a race to the bottom, where jurisdictions compete to capture
the economic and social benefits of especially lax regulations.208
Vertical regulatory structures, conversely, are often more efficient
in their operation but can suffer from too little interaction between their
197
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stakeholders.209 This dynamic often limits the effectiveness of top-down
policy initiatives, most often at the federal level.210
Integrating the two approaches, however, allows for a regulatory
process that captures the benefits of each.211 There is sufficient interaction among stakeholders for policymaking to be efficient and creative,
but also a degree of discipline and control imposed from a higher level of
government.212
As an approach to climate change mitigation policy, diagonal federalism allows for policy-driven successes and progress without necessarily
involving the Federal Government.213 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“the Initiative”) is an example of such action below the federal
level.214 Created by several northeastern states, the Initiative is a regional cap-and-trade program for electric utilities within those states.215
It established a regional emissions cap and state-specific caps, but gives
member states a degree of flexibility to tailor their own cap-and-trade
policies within the agreement.216
B.

Limits to Diagonal Federalism

As a means for making policy, diagonal federalism is not without
its limits. Most importantly, it raises a number of constitutional concerns
that can be fatal to a policy initiative between and among state and local
governments.
First, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause may preempt such
initiatives.217 Preemption may be express in the form of a federal statute
or regulation.218 State and local laws that frustrate or otherwise interfere
with federal law can be invalidated on implied preemption grounds.219
Next, the Commerce Clause may limit the scope of policy agreements between states, which can be invalidated if they interfere with the
209
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Federal Government’s power to regulate interstate commerce.220 The
Dormant Commerce Clause is also implicated in instances where an
agreement may place unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce.221
If states limit the scope of their agreements to in-state entities and
transactions, Commerce Clause concerns are likely moot.222 States may
still adopt complimentary and effective policies consistent with these
parameters.
Lastly, agreements between states and other nations could run
afoul of the Constitution’s Compact Clause.223 This is unlikely, but still
a concern that states must consider when coordinating to make climate
change mitigation policy.224 Agreements in which states adopt similar
regulations and retain individual authority over their own statutes, however, are unlikely to conflict with the Compact Clause.225
From a pragmatic perspective, diagonal federalism raises other
concerns as well. As suggested above, finding a balance between horizontal and vertical government actors can be difficult.226 Thus, a policymaking model that is truly diagonal is not always simple to create and
maintain.227 An overly horizontal structure can be duplicative and ineffective without a degree of centralizing authority.228 An overly vertical
structure can stifle policy implementation and innovation.229 Absent a
more natural center of gravity like the Federal Government, it may be
more difficult for states to organize themselves effectively under a diagonal federalism framework.
Finally, not all of the government actors within a diagonal federalism model are guaranteed to be cooperative.230 This can lead to breakdowns
in policymaking that can threaten progress and success.231 The Trump
administration’s attempt to revoke California’s emissions standards
waiver from the EPA is a high-profile example.232 Yet non-cooperativeness,
220
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if managed effectively, can be highly beneficial.233 If a regulatory structure
provides space for dissenting views, it can ultimately lead to better policy
outcomes.234 Disaffected stakeholders may seek judicial relief that can
force a more effective policy response, as was the case in Massachusetts
v. EPA.235 Non-cooperativeness can also ensure that policymakers feel
pressure to be more accommodating in their decisions, leading to a more
inclusive policy that reflects the priorities of multiple stakeholders.236
C.

Diagonal Federalism as a Response to Climate Change

Despite its limitations, diagonal federalism remains the best
model of governance within which states can respond to federal inaction
on and hostility toward climate change mitigation policy.
Climate change is arguably the most pressing public policy challenge the United States faces.237 Yet as the effects of climate change have
grown more severe, the Federal Government has demonstrated a pattern
of disengagement and even hostility toward state-level attempts at mitigating climate change.238 This pattern is the result of a confluence of
political and structural factors at the federal level, most notably the broad
opposition of the Republican Party to mitigation efforts and numerous
structural hurdles that must be overcome to enact legislation which could
address climate change.239 The federal response to climate change has
been largely through administrative rules, yet even these are subject to
changes across administrations of different political parties and potentially crippling legal challenges.240 Even if future rules like the CPP are
enacted, it seems unlikely that they will remain in force long enough for
states to rely on them.
Given the above context, it seems reflexive that states would act
to address climate change. States have long taken the lead on climate
233
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change mitigation in the United States.241 Indeed, nearly all have climate
action plans and renewable portfolio standards.242 Many others have
pursued carbon emission reduction plans.243 California established a
statewide carbon cap-and-trade program.244 The Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative serves a similar purpose.245
Diagonal federalism offers a framework within which state and local
governments can amplify the effects of existing climate change mitigation
policies and expand the reach of future ones. The structural and political
constraints that have hampered the Federal Government’s response to
climate change do not apply as readily to state and local governments.246
While states must be mindful of the legal and practical limits of diagonal
federalism, especially constitutional ones, they ought to continue pursuing climate change mitigation policies in line with its principles.
The sheer number of states, local governments, and private actors
that pledged to uphold the Paris Climate Accord following the Trump administration’s withdrawal demonstrated the potential of climate change
mitigation policy pursued through a framework of diagonal federalism.247
In lieu of stronger federal action to limit the effects of climate change,
states and local governments ought to continue collaborative efforts to do
the same.
CONCLUSION
Climate change is a collective action problem that poses a significant public policy challenge to the United States. Under such circumstances, the Federal Government and the states would ideally collaborate
to mitigate the effects of climate change. Because of entrenched political
and structural factors, the Federal Government’s response to climate
change, however, has been characterized by disengagement from and
hostility toward state efforts to blunt its effects.
Given this seemingly intractable situation, states should act in
line with the principles of diagonal federalism to mitigate climate change
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to the greatest extent possible. This framework of governance emphasizes
collaboration between and among state and local governments in the absence of federal engagement. States and municipalities have taken the
lead on climate change mitigation policy for decades. By continuing that
trend through diagonal federalism, they will amplify the effectiveness of
their existing policies and widen the scope of future initiatives. This approach remains the most viable option for states as they grapple with
climate change and an unreliable partner in the Federal Government.

